Tulsa Journal of Comparative and International Law
Volume 11 | Issue 2

Article 5

3-1-2004

Justice and Advantage in Civil Procedure:
Langbein's Conception of Comparative Law and
Procedural Justice in Question
Bradley Bryan

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tjcil
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Bradley Bryan, Justice and Advantage in Civil Procedure: Langbein's Conception of Comparative Law and Procedural Justice in Question, 11
Tulsa J. Comp. & Int'l L. 521 (2003).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tjcil/vol11/iss2/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by TU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Tulsa Journal of Comparative
and International Law by an authorized administrator of TU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact daniel-bell@utulsa.edu.

JUSTICE AND ADVANTAGE IN CIVIL PROCEDURE:
LANGBEIN'S CONCEPTION OF COMPARATIVE LAW AND
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE IN QUESTION
Bradley Bryant
"Wigmore's celebrated panegyric - that cross-examination is 'the
greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth' - is
nothing more than an articleof faith."
- John H. Langbein 1

"The German achievement calls into question fundamental
premises of our deeply flawed system of civil procedure."
- John H. Langbein 2

"The German Advantage was meant to inspire serious discussion
about issues of great magnitude
in civil procedure."
3
- John H. Langbein

Lecturer, Political Science & Law, University of Victoria; Ph.D. (ABD),
University of California at Berkeley; M.A., McGill University; LL.B., University of
Victoria; B.A. (Hons), University of British Columbia.
1. John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. Ciu. L. REV.
823, 833 n.31 (1985) (quoting 5 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1367, at 29 (3d ed.
1940)).
2. John H. Langbein, Trashing the German Advantage, 82 Nw. U. L. REV. 763, 783
(1988).
3. Id.
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"Again and again in discussions about the shortcomings of the
contemporary legal system I find when I draw upon foreign example[s]
that I am met with responses such as, 'Before you go on telling me any
more about the virtues of German civil procedure, please explain why
they had Hitler and we did
not."
4
- John H. Langbein

"If the study of comparative law were to be banned from American
law schools tomorrow morning, hardly anyone would notice."
- John H. Langbein'

"It is said that a drowning man may see his whole life flash before
him. That may be his unconscious effort to find within his experience
the resources to extricate himself from impending doom. So I have had
to view the Western traditionof law and legality, of order and justice,
in a very long historicalperspective, from its beginnings, in order to
find a way out of our presentpredicament.
That we are at the end of an era is not something that can be
proved scientifically. One 6senses it or one does not."
- Harold J. Berman

I. INTRODUCTION

On numerous occasions I have been told by senior lawyers that a
case is won or lost on the evidence, through the effective use of
procedural motions. Indeed, evidence only comes into play by virtue
of an effective use of such motions, and defenses to such motions.
Many an excellent case has been lost long before its merits could be
considered due to the out-maneuvering of opposing counsel. Knowing
how to assemble, and oppose the assemblage, of evidence by knowing
when to bring procedural motions is one of the most fundamental
skills of the litigator.
Why, one might ask, is the attention to technicality, to
maneuvering, to outsmarting the other side, and the virtues of battle
given such awe-inspiring centrality in Anglo-American systems of
law? Why does civil procedure come to take the position of an altar
for adversarial legalism where warriors come to pay homage?

4. John H. Langbein, The Influence of Comparative Procedurein the United States,
43 AM. J. COMP. L. 545, 554 (1995).
5. Id. at 549.
6. HAROLDJ. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION v (1983).
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Perhaps we should slow down: what exactly is civil procedure such
that we can understand it as distinct and related to a conception of
justice in an important way?
Upon asking such questions in pursuit of the nature of civil
procedure and its relation to a larger conception of justice as
manifested in a legal system, in its ideal as well as in practice, we
become tangled in questions of method and how to proceed: are we
asking about philosophical conceptions of justice?
Or are we
concerned with understanding how a competitive and adversarial
process brings about justice? How would we know if it did? But these
questions leave us with more direct questions about what the
particular rules in our system are for, and how effective they are (or
not) at achieving their purpose: it is into this clearing of questions
that John Langbein stepped in 1985 with his article The German
Advantage in Civil Procedure.7
At once a powder keg, Langbein's article set off a debate in
comparative law circles (and beyond) over how it was possible to
conceive of another legal system's ways as somehow advantageous.8
His argument is controversial because people are concerned about
how such things could be imported. The argument predictably
involved the degree to which it is possible to make sense of an
advantage drawn from a legal system that is quite hierarchical in
nature to be implemented in one that is understood as specifically not.
The critics pointed out that to attempt to adopt such measures is
culturally naive, politically not possible, and essentially un-American
and hence undesirable. Langbein responded by saying that this is to
throw the baby out with the bath water, to make a mockery of
comparative analysis, and to demonstrate the smugness of American

7. See Langbein, supra note 1.
8. See generally Ronald J. Allen, Idealization and Caricature in Comparative
Scholarship,82 Nw. U. L. REV. 785 (1988) (response to John H. Langbein); Ronald J.
Allen et al., The German Advantage in Civil Procedure:A Plea for More Details and
Fewer Generalities in Comparative Scholarship, 82 Nw. U. L. REV. 705 (1988);
Herbert L. Bernstein, Whose Advantage after All?: A Comment on the Comparisonof
Civil Justice Systems, 21 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 587 (1988); Michael Bohlander, The
German Advantage Revisited: An Inside View of German Civil Procedure in the
Nineties, 13 TUL. EuR. & CIV. L. F. 25 (1998); Oscar Chase, Some Observationson the
CulturalDimension in Civil ProcedureReform, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 861 (1997); Oscar
Chase, Legal Processes and National Culture, 5 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L 1 (1997);
Samuel Gross, The American Advantage: The Value of Inefficient Litigation,85 MICH.
L. REV. 734 (1987); John C. Reitz, Why We Probably Cannot Adopt the German
Advantage in Civil Procedure, 75 IOWA L. REV. 987 (1990).
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adversarial legalism. The debate ended up focusing on how one could
make sense of such a "legal transplant."9
The claim that cultural differences are simply too different and,
hence, too difficult to navigate in adopting the German advantage, or
that culture is the sacred cow not to be altered or toyed with by its
participants, sounds suspect unless we try to come to terms with the
practices that constitute culture.
Whatever the perspective, "the culture" is invoked as if it were a
powerful, uniform, enveloping medium-as vast and impersonal as
the galaxy, as inescapable as the laws of thermodynamics ....
In some ways our thinking about nature on the one hand and "the
culture" on the other has undergone a reversal within a matter of
decades. It used to be that the cultural aspect of ordinary reality
was, by definition, the part most amenable to human
transformation, whereas the natural aspect was seen as having a
dynamic of its own, which was largely out of our hands ....
[N]ature as a sovereign power has given way to nature as a
dependent ward of human custodians. Befouled and denuded,
gutted and gouged, the natural world has become a thing of frailty.
Even the most trivial of human interventions can spell catastrophe
"The culture" is today the more fearsome realm, or at any rate the

more convenient scapegoat, and the notion that we have only
limited influence over it appears to be widespread. ' °
Thus one way to ascertain whether there could be a German
advantage in civil procedure would be to articulate those aspects of
Such a task requires
culture that seem to pose difficulties.
understanding the method by which we will approach such a
question.
What this debate demands, therefore, is a division of the issue
into the two that comprise it, such that we can bring into question (i)

the nature and role of comparative law, and (ii) the interpretation of
historical traditions and the spirit of American adversarial legalism

and its ability to incorporate change.

Upon a consideration as to

9. The term "transplants" is used widely in comparative law circles to designate the
patchwork of legal institutions that have been "transplanted" from one time and
domain to other times and domains. See ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN
APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW (2d ed. 1993).

10. Cullen Murphy, The Culture Did It: A Semantic Innovation Gets Us All off the
Hook, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Dec. 2000, at 18.
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whether we can incorporate the German advantage into American law
and legal practice, the issue is how it is possible to conceive of legal
change and innovation both from the inside and the outside. Further,
we will see that it most certainly is possible to speak of legal reform,
of "legal transplants," precisely because the Law of laws in Western
societies is first and foremost positive law. We understand law as
something we use, something we create for ascertainable purposes,
and as a tool that we use to achieve results, to render justice, or to
settle disputes. We are no longer talking about a cosmic order or
cultural practices that are somehow immune to observation and
requiring technical anthropological insight into their depths: we are
comparing civil procedure.
Law is never considered an end in itself, but rather it is a method
of ordering conduct, preferences, and results. Thus Langbein is right
that the U.S. could adopt the German Advantage: how could it not?
In a very simple way, how could we make sense of an advantage in
procedure if we did not already understand laws as something
disposable, in the sense of always being replaceable by better laws?
Because American law, indeed positive law after Austin, is conceived
in terms of achieving an end, it is not unique among Western systems
of law. In considering the two aspects of the question above, we will
see that the controversy surrounding the article was at crosspurposes. The confusion about our own history, as reflected in the
struggle between the common law and civilian tradition, does much to
obscure the central unity of purpose behind the origins of the Western
Legal Tradition. The concern over incorporating what appear to be
quasi-inquisitorial institutions into an adversarial system need to be
understood in their entirety, in terms of the history of such
institutions and how they have come to be understood essentially.
The judicial institution of the court is a much different one in common
law countries than it is in its civilian counterparts, but it is essential
to see why it is different. Any exercise that attempts to make sense of
comparative legal institutions must be able to zero in on the essence
of the differences that animate each if it is going to pursue questions
of whether certain institutional arrangements would work
elsewhere. 1 Thus, though the civilian tradition has been defined by
11. There are some excellent recent articles on the nature and purposes of
comparative legal research and its agenda. See RENP DAVID & JOHN BRIERLEY, MAJOR
LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD TODAY: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE COMPARATIVE STUDY
OF LAW (2d ed. 1978); MIRJAN DAMASKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY:
A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO THE LEGAL PROCESS (1986); KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN
KOTZ, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAw 1-47 (Tony Weir trans., Oxford University

TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.

[Vol. 11:2

codification and the common law by stare decisis, the fallout for a
procedural conception of the law as expressed in American
adversarial legalism is only clear after ascertaining the purpose
inherent in comparative analysis: a comprehension of the historical
tradition that informs each, and thereby understanding the spirit of
the laws of each country. Only in this way can we make sense of what
an advantage could be.
Put another way, it is clear that it is entirely consistent with the
spirit of American laws and its pragmatic public philosophy that civil
procedure is seen as institutional arrangements designed to facilitate
a set of results. These results are what is considered crucial to the
goal of justice in American legalism, and that it is possible to conceive
of improving law: because law is positive law, it is always goaldirected, a means, a tool, and therefore, replaceable by any other set
of laws that can achieve that goal in a better way. Thus the argument
over the American advantage must be, first, about comparative law in
its essence, and second, about the commensurability of legal practices
across legal cultures as expressed by divergent histories.
By
undergoing such an analysis we would be able to veritably ask and
answer whether an advantage in procedure is possible for America.
The answer, we will see, is that advantage only makes sense in a
regime of positive law that sees the law as a tool (but in a rich way, in
contrast to its end) posited by humans as a way of bringing about just
results, said results being a proper ordering of human relations
according to criteria chosen and/or expressed by the polity itself. As
such (i.e. that law is a tool), procedural justice is defined not by what
it is, but by what it can do, and it automatically speaks the language
of advantage.
Such an insight brings to Anglo-American
jurisprudence and legal theory the realization that a concept of justice
is tied to the way we conceive of what we are doing. Because the spirit
of American law speaks so loudly about civil procedure as crucial to
justice due to the way it focuses the court toward truth while
safeguarding the rights of the parties, we most certainly can look to
the German model. Langbein is right.

Press 3d ed. 1998); James Gordley, Is Comparative Law a Distinct Discipline?,46 AM.
J. COMP. L. 607 (1998); Ugo Mattei, Three Patternsof Law: Taxonomy and Change in
the World's Legal Systems, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 5 (1997).
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II. LANGBEIN ON THE GERMAN ADVANTAGE 12

Langbein's argument is not simply that certain aspects of the
modern German system of civil procedure are superior to American
civil procedure, but that, in considering the totality of rules and
processes, in a comparison that highlights the way these rules serve
(or not) their purposes, it would be advantageous for American civil
procedure to become more like its German counterpart with respect to
the way such rules structure the fact-finding process. Now the
question is: advantageous in what sense? Langbein is quite clear
about this: "German civil procedure strikes a better balance between
lawyerly and judicial responsibility in the conduct of civil justice.""
This is not to say that lawyers in Germany do not play an important
and instrumental role in fact-finding, and it is not to say that judges
play no role in American civil procedure; rather, the key for Langbein
is that the German balance it better.
The ultimate reason for Langbein's admiration of the German
model is the procedural elements of the system allow for the finding of
the truth to be uninhibited by the tactical maneuvering of the parties
or lawyers. Rather than leave the sole responsibility for adducing
evidence to the parties' lawyers, the German quasi-inquisitorial model
gives judges the ability to call the evidence they think is needed. This
is because in civil law countries, courts, not lawyers, are assigned the
task of leading the investigation into matters of fact. 4 Entailed in
this ability is also the court's jurisdiction over expert testimony: court
appointed experts give testimony on issues that require it. This does
not mean that there are no methods available to the parties to
safeguard their interests in the selection of the expert; rather, it
simply means they do not have the opportunity to preparean expert of
12. See John H. Langbein, Comparative Civil Procedure and the Style of Complex
Contracts, 35 AM. J. COMP. L. 381 (1987); John H. Langbein, Cultural Chauvinism in
ComparativeLaw, 5 CARDOZO J. INT'L & CoMP. L 41 (1997); John H. Langbein, Will
Contests, 103 YALE L.J. 2039 (1994); Langbein, supra note 1; Langbein, supra note 2;
Langbein, supra note 4. See also ROBERT COVER & OWEN M. Fiss, THE STRUCTURE OF
PROCEDURE (1979); FRANK DIEDRICH & HARALD KOCH, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN GERMANY
(1998); NIGEL FOSTER, GERMAN LEGAL SYSTEM & LAWS (3d ed. 2002); LAWRENCE M.
FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW (2d ed. 1985); LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN,
AMERICAN LAW (1984); Peter Gottwald, Civil ProcedureReform in Germany, 45 AM. J.
COMP. L. 753 (1997); Benjamin Kaplan et al., & Rudolf Schaefer, Phases of German

Civil Procedure1, 71 HARv. L. REv. 1193 (1958); ZWEIGERT & KOTZ, supra note 11.
13. Langbein, Cultural Chauvinism in Comparative Law, supra note 12, at 42.
14. Langbein, supra note 1, at 824; Langbein, Cultural Chauvinism in Comparative
Law, supra note 12, at 42.
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their own choice." Langbein argues that under the American model,
where expert testimony is commissioned and prepared by the parties,
"a systematic distrust and devaluation of expertise" arises. 16 Such
devaluation arises ostensibly out of the fact that experts differ on
various factual issues, thus begging the question of how "truthful"
expert evidence can be.17 As we will see, the greater degree of control
over the fact-finding process by the judge rather than lawyer is where
Langbein's conviction about the German advantage lies. American
adversarialism champions advocacy, and as such, champions an
adversarial understanding of truth, one that encourages a "truth
through dialogue" understanding of how to proceed. Indeed, this is
the bedrock for any adversarial system.18
The German system gives responsibility to the judges for
determining the order of proof, providing for, calling, and carrying out
the examination of witnesses, creating a compact record of the
witnesses' testimony by dictating summaries of that testimony, and
through the securing and examination of experts where required.19
He notes that we must not think that the American model is really so
different that an adoption of aspects of the German model would not
make sense: "A high theme of recent American civil procedure

15. Indeed, there is no "preparation" of witnesses or experts because there is no
distinction between pre-trial and trial; because the judges control the fact-finding
process, what need is there of pre-trial discovery?
16. Langbein, supra note 1, at 836.
17. This also has to do with the way "truth" and its value comes to be conceived
historically under each system, something we will return to in Section 3(ii). See
Miijan Damaska, Truth in Adjudication, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 289 (1998).
18. It is not disputed that the major difference between adversarial and what are
called "inquisitorial" systems is the way they understand truth to be properly
elucidated. Even though properly speaking the German Civilian system is only
inquisatorial in criminal matters, it is still, a question of the difference in such styles
and whether the strength of such a difference makes discussion of an advantage
functionally impossible. See id.; see also Daphne Barak-Erez, Codification and Legal
Culture: In Comparative Perspective, 13 TUL. EUR. & Civ. L.F. 125 (1998); Mirjan
Damaska, The Uncertain Fate of Evidentiary Transplants: Anglo-American and
ContinentalExperiments, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 839 (1997); James Gordley, Codification
and Legal Scholarship, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 735 (1998); James Gordley,
ComparativeLegal Research: Its Function in the Development of Harmonized Law, 43
AM. J. COMP. L. 555 (1995); Annelise Riles, Wigmore's Treasure Box: Comparative
Law in the Era of Information, 40 HARV. INT'L. L.J. 221 (1999); Ruti Teitel,
TransitionalJurisprudence:The Role of Law in Political Transformation, 106 YALE
L.J. 2009 (1997) (a wonderful article on legal transformation serves as a supplement
to BERMAN, supra note 6).
19. Langbein, supra note 1, at 826-30.
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scholarship is the recognition of the immense power over pretrial
management that American judges have come to exercise, with scant
Thus, on the one hand, Langbein
safeguard for litigants. '
demonstrates the centrality of the position of the judge to direct the
way evidence is to be entered on the record (from witness and expert
testimony to the production of the record), while on the other hand
noting that the American model is not so anarchic as to be able to
warrant giving American judges more control over the evidentiary
process. What is remarkable is that Langbein, while championing the
German model, eschews "managerial judging"2' on the ground that it
is governed by the whim of the judge, is merely an administrative
attribute that usually attaches to complex cases, and does nothing to
alter the institutional arrangements governing fact-finding, because it
is fact-finding that is key.22
What happens to lawyers in the German model? Are they mere
administrative specialists who do the court's bidding when asked?
Not at all. The lawyers are required to provide documents and to
identify the witnesses that the lawyer and client feel support their
case. There is room here for effective lawyering that is not reducible
to simple servitude or administration. "Outside the realm of factgathering, German civil procedure is about as adversarial as our own
....

Accordingly, the proper question is not whether to have law-yers

[sic], but how to use them; not whether to have an adversarial
component... but how to prevent adversarial excesses.' '
Once one considers what it is that Langbein thinks is at issue,
the advantage of the German model is clear: the sheer difficulty for a
court to determine what actually happened and what is at issue
becomes, under the American model, clouded by lawyers who are only
bringing forth the facts that fit their case, and leaving the rest for the

20. Langbein, CulturalChauvinism in ComparativeLaw, supra note 12, at 47. He is
referring to the excellent scholarship on "managerial judging," much of which
followed the pioneering works by Judith Resnick. See Judith Resnick, Failing Faith:
Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. Cm. L. REV. 494 (1986); Judith Resnick,
Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REv. 376 (1982). This is definitely not the same
argument regarding the expansion of the power of the judiciary. See MARTIN
SHAPIRO, CouRTs: A COMPARATIVE AND POLITIcAL ANALYsIs (1981).

21. Refers to the increasing bureaucratic control exercised by judges in managing
cases towards settlement, and the set of institutional practices that go along with
such an increase. See Langbein, supra note 1, at 860-62.

22. "I side with Blackstone in thinking that fact-finding is the central task of civil
litigation." Id. at 847.

23. Id. at 841-42.
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other side or the court to figure out. The advantages of the German
model are that it reduces the cost of litigation while enhancing the
quality of testimony by reducing the opportunity for partisan
lawyering. Partisan lawyering, he contends, places incentives on
lawyers to not give the whole truth, but simply the truth that fits
their side.14 By focusing on the way that partisan lawyering, the
essence of American adversialism, impedes the effective function of a
court of justice, Langbein put his finger on an issue that was bound to
create a reaction. First, his comparative analysis makes us wonder
why the American focus on adversarialism has been privileged at all
since it seems very irrational in the face of effective fact-finding.
Second, Langbein's study begs the question (and suggests an answer)
of why lawyers have come to assume such power and centrality in
America, and makes it puzzling to understand how it is that lawyers
actually do produce an adequate record for the court.25 Finally, it also
points to the fact that adversarialism is in some way part and parcel
to the American tradition in a way that is not negligible-otherwise it
would not be an issue of adopting the model but rather tweaking the
rules.26
Langbein is, however, careful to distinguish such judicial control
from "managerial judging" where judges get involved in a managerial
way in order to expedite the process. The distinction, it seems, is
critical. For it is here that he rests the case for an attempt to bring
German elements into the American model. "[The trend toward
managerial judging is] telling evidence for the proposition that
judicial fact-gathering could work well in a system that preserved
much of the rest of what we now have in civil procedure. '27 Langbein
is not saying that managerial judging looks like the German model,
but rather that the American trend towards it demonstrates that the

24. Indeed, this is not simply an incentive, it is the lawyer's duty: one of the major

issues for the professional responsibility of the lawyer is the contest between the
fiduciary duty he/she has to the client, and the duty to not mislead the court. As most
Codes of Professional Conduct across regions show, it is a lawyer's duty to recognize

and balance the interests of the client and the court in each and every case.
25. See 1 ALEXIs TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 282-91 (Henry Reeve trans.,

Phillips Bradley ed., Vintage Books 1945) (1848).
26. See Langbein, supra note 1, at 841-43; see also Robert Kagan, Adversarial
Legalism and American Government, 10 J. OF POLY ANALYSIS & MGMT. 369, 371-75,
378-79, 389-90 (1991) (discussing whether there are deeper institutional aspects that
would need "tweaking").
27. Langbein, supra note 1, at 825.
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American model is not as anti-authoritarian as many contend. 28 In
addition to trends in managerial judging, one must contend with the
superior political power that courts in America wield: a function of
their lack of authoritarianism? 2 9
III. THE RESULTING CRITICAL ENGAGEMENT
Even if Langbein's comment lumping 1000 years of British
history into a sociological category without much worry in his
identification of the "cult of the common law" was not enough, there
was little doubt that his 1985 article would generate controversy. The
most pointed response was from Ronald Allen and his colleagues. 0
They argued that Langbein's comparison was much too general a
description of the differing traditions of procedure, and that in order
to capture the essence of such differences, the exact difficulties and
concrete examples of how the American adversarial process goes
astray need to be given. In fact, Allen and his crew give many
examples of how the American adversarial process functions to help
with fact-finding, and the various mechanisms and procedural rules
that are designed with the sole purpose of expediting pre-trial
discovery and trial procedure in a fair way. With extensive literature
and cases to back up their claims, Allen and his colleagues state that
the American system works very efficiently towards settlement of
disputes, 31 that there are problems with the German approach that
the Germans themselves recognize,32 that Langbein's article ignores
the "big case" in favor of the "little case,"3 3 that the discussion of
experts is much too general to glean whether such a system is in fact
advantageous,34 that a professionally trained judiciary that is not
selected from a large pool of seasoned lawyers is not demonstrably

28.
29.
30.
31.

Langbein, Cultural Chauvinism in ComparativeLaw, supra note 12, at 45-49.
See SHAPIRO, supra note 20.
See Allen et al., supra note 8.
Id. at 705-09. See also Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984).

Fiss argues that the goal of settling has nothing to do with the proper aim of the trial.
It is interesting to consider that, in the vast majority of cases that are not settled, the

major legal issue that confronts the court is not the main one that the parties
identify; indeed, the entire body of caselaw on civil procedure is the result of

procedural maneuvering that ended the dispute. This is certainly not the kind of
justice that Fiss is arguing for, is it?
32. Allen et al., supra note 8, at 761.
33. Id. at 708-13.

34. Id. at 760.
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better, 5 that the element of surprise in litigation does not operate as
Langbein suggests because the rules of civil procedure and the
discretion of the court operate to constrain it," and that overall, one
needs descriptive accuracy in order to justify such a broad claim as a
German "advantage."" As they note, their article is aimed at looking
at the details of legal practice and inquiring as to how such details
could fit within Langbein's discussion: they contend that the details
do not fit his characterization of the difference. 8
Langbein's response was to note that the German system is still
an adversarial system in that, though the court directs the finding of
fact, the court's role is overseen by the counsel of each party.39 Even
so, in the German model there is no coaching of witnesses, and he
asks, boldly, how such a practice can be defended in the name of
"truth in adjudication. ' 0 With respect to the claim that surprise is
minimal in America, Langbein repeats his previous admonishment
that there certainly is surprise. To say that rules of procedure
operate to diminish surprise is to miss the point, as Langbein is not
referring to those episodes of pre-trial misbehavior. 4' Anyone who has
ever taken a stroll through the floors of litigation departments across
the country knows that surprise is indeed something that the trial
42
lawyer strives for. Uncompromisingly harsh, Langbein asserts that
when we speak of a German advantage in comparative scholarship,
we are trying to assess what we can do to understand ourselves and
better equip our institutions to do the things we would hope they
would.43
Another line of questioning asks whether it makes any sense to
speak of "advantage" in comparative scholarship when we are
confronted with those aspects of institutional arrangements that are
fundamental to the nature of the system itself." But how, it may be

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. at 745-61.
Id. at 720-30.
Id. at 707 n.8.
Allen et al., supra note 8, at 761-62.
Langbein, supra note 2, at 763.

40. Id. at 766.
41. Id. at 770.
42.

See JAMES B. STEWART, THE PARTNERS: INSIDE AMERICA'S MOST POWERFUL LAW

FIRMS 245 (1983) (a tumultuous and warlike account of the law firm Kennecott,
Sullivan & Cromwell); cf Langbein, Will Contests, supra note 12 (description of a
similar situation).
43. See Langbein, supra note 4.
44. See Bernstein, supra note 8; Reitz, supra note 8.
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asked, can simple procedural rules regarding the finding of fact be
central? What difference does it make if the judge asks the questions
or if the lawyer prepares the witnesses for examination and crossexamination? Apparently it makes a great deal of difference. Oscar
Chase has argued that even though the German model might appear
to be more efficient, result in better fact-finding, and make sense, it is
still contrary to the fundamental nature of American legal culture
because it so intrinsically anti-authoritarian.4" Having judges direct
the process is simply contrary to the American spirit of the laws.46
Langbein is unsympathetic to such an argument, claiming that to
hide behind the veil of culture is not an explanation but a tautology:
"[wihat his argument boils down to is the claim that we Americans
cannot aspire to such improvements because we are Americans and
they are Germans. '
Though essentially the same argument, but articulated with
more depth, John Reitz argues that we could not adopt the central
aspect of German procedure, namely, a judicially dominated factfinding process, "without changing many other fundamental
characteristics of our modem civil procedure."4 In a nutshell, the
claim is that procedural justice is the heart of American legal culture.
In order for justice to be done, the parties must have a fair chance at
controlling the process by which the evidence on the record is
produced either for them or against them. 49 Any institutional
arrangement that gives the power to the judge to direct the
production of evidence is necessarily at odds with the firmament of
American law. Drawing on an example that Langbein himself uses,
Reitz notes that even though Rule 614 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence empowers the federal district court to call witnesses on its
own motion, it is never done. Indeed, he notes that on the books the
American judge appears to have more power than his or her German
counterpart-a fact we should bear in mind-but that such power is
circumscribed by the deep practice in American legal culture of
parties directing the way their case will go.5 ° Thus Reitz's argument
45. Chase, Legal Processes and National Culture, supra note 8.
46. We will consider in more detail below what could be meant by the American
spirit of the laws.
47. Langbein, CulturalChauvinism in ComparativeLaw, supra note 12, at 45.

48. Reitz, supra note 8, at 988.
49. We will dig into aspects of this below when we consider the nature of the
American tradition.
50. The same is true in Canada and England, where judges are empowered under

rules of civil procedure to call and examine witnesses and to direct the production of
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is that the control of the fact-finding process is not decisively with
lawyers, but that American adversarialism has at its heart a
commitment to let the parties succeed or fail on the merits of the
evidence that they themselves have entered. 5 ' This argument thus
finesses Chase's point, in essence also arguing that in the end the
German model is not consistent with central traits of American legal
culture.52
As Langbein fully admits, underlying this difference is the
concept of civil procedure as a way of securing a particular vision of
justice between parties-he recognizes that we are dealing with
different legal cultures. We can imagine the set of questions that
Langbein would pose: what significance can an explanation that
draws on "culture" have unless we elaborate what we mean (i.e.
particular constitutive practices as embodied in fundamental
institutions)? Simply because we have come to do certain things in a
way that has become customary (even "cultural"), can we not look to
other traditions for advice, for innovation, for ways of improving? Can
we make sense of improvement if the dead hand of culture is to be
what we are resigned to? Should we not instead be wise to the lessons
of elsewhere, not simply to understand why they do what they do, but
to highlight why we do what we do?5'

Langbein's response to these

lines of argument is as follows: he has indicted critics as cultural
chauvinists, has called them members of the "cult of the common
law,", 4 and has claimed that they have engaged in severe myopia in
their rejection of veritable lessons to be learned from elsewhere."' To
say that the fundamental barrier to legal change or to comparative
analysis is "culture" is not to say very much. 56 Moreover, cultural
practices are defined as different in kind rather than in degree, for if
their difference is of degree, then we could conceivably adopt them.
The argument from culture must therefore be one that claims the

evidence all on their own motion. This is so rarely done, and when it is done, it is
because the "proper" method has broken down.

51. This is important for historical reasons, as we will see.
52. See Chase, Some Observations on the Cultural Dimension in Civil Procedure
Reform, supra note 8; Chase, Legal Processesand National Culture, supra note 8.
53. Langbein notes that we are taught Latin to learn English, and that in the same

vein the study of comparative law allows us to see what we do more clearly by
pointing to our practices as somehow contingent. Langbein, supra note 4, at 545.
54. See Langbein, supra note 2.
55. See Langbein, supra note 4; Langbein, Cultural Chauvinism in Comparative
Law, supra note 12.
56. Langbein, Cultural Chauvinism in ComparativeLaw, supra note 12, at 41, 48.
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ends of German and American justice to involve incommensurable
ends. As above, culture "is today the.., fearsome realm, or at any
rate the.. . convenient scapegoat, and the notion that we have only
limited influence over it appears to be widespread.6 ' Indeed, much of
Langbein's work would certainly have us reflect on the kinds of
distinctions he draws, especially considering the breadth of his
knowledge in comparative law. Note how this makes demands not
just on procedure, but on the project of comparative scholarship.
Allen and his colleagues do not debunk comparative research, but
the tenor of their response most certainly makes one wonder what
form of comparative scholarship can properly yield examples of
advantages. For if the German model is not advantageous, because
they have not been able to find the data that suggests that judges act
in the way that Langbein suggests. We are thus pushed back into
questions of what would be proper for our tradition, and hence of how
such advantages could be possible for us.
Langbein's response has a cross-purpose from that articulated by
Allen: Allen wants data about what people believe is the case and how
they act, and Langbein is looking to understand the larger
institutional arrangements that give expression to the data. As such,
each necessarily understands the other as coming at the issue entirely
wrongly. But even when we ask whether it makes sense to speak of
advantage in comparative procedure, we must see that the underlying
question asks us to articulate the degree to which the legal practices
of each country, as embodiments of two distinct traditions of justice,
are different in their essence, i.e., incommensurable, or a difference
that can be overcome: do these two legal systems point at the same
thing? Are they both serving a justice that is commensurable? If not,
then can we speak of an advantage? More importantly, even if their
goals are entirely different, could we still nonetheless speak of an
advantage? Indeed, to make sense of an advantage, must we not
already be able to conceive of it being a matter where such a thing is
possible? And in order for it to be possible, what other conditions
must be true? Is it not the case that we could choose this or that set
of procedural institutions to govern our affairs? Is it not true that we
could have these procedural rules or other ones? So is Langbein's
point not apt? If we are to traffic in the business of positive law, then
it always makes sense to speak of advantage since the actual content of
the rules themselves no longer delineates a coherent historical
tradition based on articulationsof justice, but rather a patchwork of

57. Murphy, supra note 10, at 18.
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transplants of posited law understood as the tool of a society to solve
disputes.58 Is it really a question of the incommensurability of two
competing systems that seeks to render a just result on disputes? Or
have we assumed that these traditions differ more than they do? We
are reminded, then, of the difficulty of comparative law, and of the
importance of grappling with the historical tradition that informs
each system in order to fully understand the content of these positive
procedural laws.
This most certainly asks us to elaborate more clearly what it is
we are after with comparative scholarship, how we substantiate it,
and in what ways we would be able to understand the particular
of another state as somehow
institutional arrangements
advantageous. By looking at the nature of comparative research, and
by looking into the nature of the historical traditions and conceptions
of justice that inform each system, we can come to an understanding
of when it is possible to understand "advantage" by comprehending
whether a given innovation speaks to the spirit of the law that is
contained and expressed by the system itself. We will thus discuss
the historical traditions and the spirit of American law in light of the
insights provided by comparative law.
IV. DISCUSSION

We have seen that the issue of whether there could be a German
advantage in civil procedure demands that we understand what
possibilities arise in the study of comparative law, the historical depth
that separates the German and American traditions, and the spirit of
American legal institutions. In doing so we will see that the debate
over the German advantage has indeed been at cross-purposes, and
once we begin speaking of advantage it is possible to comprehend a
German advantage for American civil procedure. First, we will ask
what we can accomplish through the study of comparative law by
grasping that at which it aims.5 9 Second, we will ask the questions

58. In this regard, I am indebted to the insights of Harold Berman and Alan Watson.
See BERMAN, supra note 6; WATSON, supra note 9; ALAN WATSON, SOURCES OF LAW,
LEGAL CHANGE, AND AMBIGUITY (1984).
59. See C.K. ALLEN, LAW IN THE MAKING (7th ed. 1964); PATRICK ATIYAH & ROBERT
SUMMERS, FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW (1987); BERMAN, supra note
6; DAMASKA, supra note 11; DAVID & BRIERLEY, supra note 11; CHARLES DE SECONDAT,
BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS (Thomas Nugent trans., Hafner
1949) (1748); PHILLIPE NONET & PHILIP SELZNICK, LAW AND SOCIETY IN TRANSITION:
TOWARD RESPONSIVE LAW (1978); ROSCOE POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW
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that are at the base of this analysis: what are the historical and
traditional aspects of these two systems that give rise to this debate?
What are the presuppositions that each system works upon? What do
the different methods of fact-finding signify? What are the variables
that make each system work or not work? To answer these questions
we need to understand the essential difference between the Germanic
tradition and its turn towards codification and what is referred to as a
more inquisitorial system. We also need to understand the common
law's "successful" resistance to the codification movement. Thus, if, as
it is said, we learn Latin to better learn English, so too we can learn
from the German tradition insofar as what it says can and does speak
to our own way of doing things.
In light of our brief historical sketch, what is it about the spirit of
the law in America that conditions its adversarial legalism, and is
there something about it that makes the idea of a German advantage
not simply possible or even palatable, but realistic? The answer will
lie in the positivistic nature of the two legal systems, and the
underlying similarity in the conception of positive justice that has
come to animate both systems. We turn first to understand the way
the task of the study of comparative law is conceived.
A. Comparative Law
Langbein tells us that comparative law is dead, and that we have
killed it. 0 He claims that nowhere else in the world is the study of
other legal systems so absent as in America.
One of the
fundamentally most interesting branches of legal science practically
does not exist-and Langbein wants to revive it.
Why? What is the task of comparative law and why does
Langbein find it so compelling? "Foreign example teaches you about
your own system, both by helping you ask important questions, and
by suggesting other ways."6' But if it is simply a matter of self-study,
arguably we are more effective students of our own laws by simply
studying our own legal conceptions and practice. This does not tell us
how foreign examples teach, but highlights differences.
(1921); SHAPIRO, supra note 20; MICHAEL TIGAR & MADELEINE LEVY, LAW AND THE RISE
OF CAPITALISM (1977); WATSON, supra note 9; WATSON, SOURCES OF LAW, LEGAL
CHANGE, AND AMBIGUITY, supra note 58; ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW
(1995); ZWIEGERT & KOTZ, supra note 11; Barak-Erez, supra note 18; Gordley, supra
note 11; Gordley, supra note 18; Mattei, supra note 11; Riles, supra note 18; Teitel,

supra note 18.
60. See Langbein, supra note 4.

61. Id. at 545.

TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.

[Vol. 11:2

Though comparative law as a distinct branch of legal science has
developed and changed its purposes, it has always focused on the
study of legal systems, their similarities and differences in structure,
rule, and purpose.6 2 But as Kotz and Zweigert note, the underlying
rationale has evolved. Initially, at the Paris Exhibition of 1900,
where the International Congress for Comparative Law was founded,
the understanding was that comparative law would effectively map
the history of the human spirit, of its rational development towards a
rational system of law across nations.63 The spirit of progress
intoxicated Western jurists:
[C]omparative law must resolve the accidental and divisive
differences in the laws of peoples at similar stages of cultural and
economic development, and reduce the number of divergencies in
law, attributable not to the political, moral, or social qualities of the
different nations but to historical accident or to temporary or
contingent circumstances.64
As the faith in progress waned through the century, a new
understanding of comparative law came to dominate, that it is above
all a field of knowledge that studies "not only the techniques of
interpreting the texts, principles, rules, and standards of a national
system, but also the discovery of models for preventing or resolving
social conflicts ...

."r5

It is commonly understood that such a study

can provide a more robust account of methods for addressing and
resolving social problems and conflicts. The law is understood as the
expression of the way that a community chooses to organize itself visA-vis the social problems that arise.66
Thus comparative law understands law as a series of institutions
through which we accomplish things in our various polities-and
thus the discipline of comparative law is one of law's richest
techniques for coming to understand differing ways to approach
problems. "Comparative law is an '6cole de vdritg' which extends and
enriches the 'supply of solutions. " r" Indeed, Katz and Zweigert go

62. See ZWEIGERT & KOTZ,supra note 11.

63. Id. at 2-4, 15-16, 50-62.
64. Id. at 3.
65. Id. at 15 (emphasis added).
66. Compare MONTESQUIEU, supra note 59, at 1-7, with ZWEIGERT & KOTZ, supra
note 11, at 1-17.
67. ZWEIGERT & KOTz, supra note 11, at 15. They further note that comparative law
has proven "extremely useful" in Eastern Europe where legal systems are being re-
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much further in this description, seeing law and its institutions as
entirely driven by the needs of social practice:
If comparative analysis suggests the adoption of a particular
solution to a problem arrived at in another system one cannot reject
the proposal simply because the solution is foreign and ipso facto
To those who object to the 'foreignness' of
unacceptable.
importations, RUDOLPH V. JHERING has given the conclusive

answer:
The reception of foreign legal institutions is not a matter
nationality, but of usefulness and need. No one bothers
fetch a thing from afar when he has one as good or better
home, but only a fool would 68refuse quinine just because
didn't grow in his back garden.

of
to
at
it

If faith in progress waned throughout the century, then one could
argue that it is alive and well in the domain of comparative law.
Solutions from abroad are seen, above all, as solutions, which implies
a whole host of things about what law is for and what a judicial
decision is about. 69 We will return to this theme, but for now it is
important to note that the underlying rationale in comparative law is
that law is above all about solving conflicts, and that because the
study of foreign ways of solving conflicts yields insight into our own
way of solving conflicts, we are necessarily to be drawn to
comparative study.
Some might object that to study other legal systems in order to
find out what is "useful" for one's own system is to colonize, and to
illegitimately make light of the fundamental differences that exist
between nations. And yet, to object to the study of comparative law as
somehow colonial in its focus on other ways of doing things as "useful"
makes not only the study of comparative law seem ridiculous, but the
study of anything other than a restricted range of material as near
impossible. As Langbein wryly observes: "[tlo be sure, the fads of
Continental philosophy have their innings; the cognoscenti invoke
Foucault, Derrida, and Habermas. But the lessons of the Swiss Code
or the work of the German Verfassungsgericht are simply unknown."0
And further,

designed from the ground up. Id. at 17. One wonders for whom it is useful:
legislators?
68. Id. (quoting Giest des romishcen Rechts, Part I (9th edn., 1955) 8 f.).
69. Cf. Fiss, supra note 31.
70. Langbein, supra note 4, at 547.
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[i]f you have been trained to view legal doctrine as a pack of feeble or
even dishonest excuses, excuses masking the real interests and forces

that underlie and explain the work of the courts, you will not have
much regard for the Burgerliches Gesetzbuch and for the style of legal
reasoning that it embodies and fosters.71

Though perhaps somewhat unfair, indeed, as soon as we see law
and judicial process as a function of power and interest, we wonder
why we would replace one system of power and influence with
another-but this is to miss the essence of the intended use of
comparative law. The goal of comparative law is to understand law as
a practical affair, of social interaction and institutional arrangement,
all within a historical context that breathes meaning into the way
things are done.
Perhaps more deeply, Rend David has pointed out that
"comparative law is useful in pointing out the variations which exist
in the very concept of law itself."72 This is of interest because
variations on the theme of law bring us to understand what the ideal
of law must be, its expression of justice, and its centrality to the being
of a people.73 In this view, comparative analysis cannot be merely a
sociology law, but must entail questions of normative import,
questions4 which necessarily involve historical and philosophical
aspects .74

It has sometimes been noted that too narrow a view of law makes it
impossible for scholars of other disciplines -historians, political
scientists, sociologists, philosophers-to study it effectively. If law
is treated merely as the prevailing rules, procedures, and

techniques, it has little interest for social scientists or humanists. 5
And so the question becomes if law is merely the rules and
procedures we use to pursue ends, then why is it of less interest?
Ostensibly because we cease to understand such rules as embodying
social practices that signify more than an ordering of conduct.
We need to overcome the reduction of law to a set of technical
devices for getting things done; the separation of law from history;
the identification of all our law with national law and of all our
legal history with national legal history; the fallacies of an

71. Id. at 551.
72. DAVID & BRIERLEY, supra note 11, at 5.
73. See, e.g., GEORG WILHEM FRIEDERICH HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (Thomas

Knox trans., 1952) (1821).
74. See DAVID & BRIERLEY, supra note 11, at 12-13.
75. BERMAN, supra note 6, at vii.
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exclusively political and analytical jurisprudence ("positivism"), or
an exclusively philosophical and moral jurisprudence ("natural-law
theory"), or an exclusively historical and social-economic
jurisprudence ("the historical school," [or] "the social theory of law").
We need a jurisprudence that integrates the three traditional
schools and goes beyond them. Such an integrative jurisprudence
would emphasize that law has to be believed in or it will not work;
it involves not only reason and will but also emotion, intuition, and
faith. It involves a total social commitment.76
But such a task for comparative law seems pointed at the
philosophical conception of law itself. For the comparativist the
question, "what of the practice of comparative law," takes on a new
richness: no longer shall we simply compare the technical rules and
procedures, but rather the aims, purposes, methods, results, and
above all, conceptions of law and justice. Langbein has provided us
with some clues of what such an analysis looks like in practice.
Rather than looking to the particular details, date, and
technicalities of rules as highlighted (by their absence) by Allen and
his colleagues, Langbein draws our attention to the aims: the finding
of facts, the production of evidence, and the way truth is to be
revealed during a trial. 7 Nowhere in the American rules of evidence
or civil procedure does it say that adversarialism is the way the
system is to be characterized; rather, this is an outcome that is
consciously sought through the construction of certain rules and
procedures. Indeed, it too is an ideal type that can only be articulated
and understood among those who sense that there is something to it.
The way that fact-finding is perceived in terms of the concept of
justice that it serves is something that is most certainly not put into
the form of rules-though the rules must serve the larger purpose of
attaining what everyone in the polity at some level understands as
"justice." Thus, since all of these elements are to be grasped
conceptually through an examination of the practice, we need to
understand that practice conceptually.
For precisely this reason we can now understand Langbein's
frustration with the default position of "culture" as a reason against
adopting the German Advantage. Such an articulation makes it
difficult to understand the nature of what rules are and what they are
for. Indeed, an argument that uses "culture" in its explanation does
not allow us to delve into the complexities of legal systems as

76. Id. at vi-vii.
77. Langbein, supra note 2, at 763-64.
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embodiments masking historical traditions, which is why
comparativist studies necessarily place a heavy emphasis on the
historical foundations that inform that tradition. This is very
different than making an argument based on culture, because it gives
a frame of reference, a way into the institutions to understand what
they stand for and how they fit within the larger understanding of
justice as a whole.
For this very reason, Langbein can concede that there are
difficulties in importing certain rules and procedures into the
American system, not simply because of its different legal culture, but
because the very spirit of the American system involves layer upon
layer of historical significance, and as Langbein notes, an
unwillingness to borrow. It is as though the pragmatism that defines
American political philosophy is itself a culprit here, giving rise to a
certain unwillingness to import examples, but rather wanting to do
things on its own-its own history is the history to be celebrated;
there is nothing to fix. 78

The ethos of American pragmatism has

always privileged "figuring it out on our own":
But more than mere Denkstil, more than aversion to the
conceptualism of Continental law, underlies the American
disinterest in comparative law, particularly procedural law. There
is a practical difficulty in using comparative example across the
gulf that divides Anglo-American from Continental procedure. The
extreme interconnectedness of the various attributes of a legal
procedural system make it quite difficult to borrow selectively.
This difficulty is then reinforced in the United States through a
powerful ideology of celebration. This ideology, which asserts the
superiority of Anglo-American legal procedure, I have taken to
calling "The Cult of the Common Law."79
Thus for Langbein, the importance of understanding what law is,
and what it is for, is critical in the enterprise of comparative law. He
sees the rejection of the German Advantage not so much as an
argument based on the relative merits and disadvantages,"' but
rather as a complete dismissal of it and of comparative law on the
81
whole.
So when Langbein indicts his critics for citing Continental
78. This

is

well canvassed by

2 DANIEL BOORSTIN, THE AMERICANS: THE NATIONAL

EXPERIENCE 5-20 (1965).

79. Langbein, supra note 4, at 551.
80. See Langbein, Cultural Chauvinism in Comparative Law, supra note 12, at 783
(Langbein's appreciation of Gross's criticisms as compared to Allen).
81. Id.
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philosophers disingenuously, he has a point: if the ultimate problem is
with comparative analysis on the whole, then we should be making
arguments about the possibility of cross-cultural interpretation, and
basing our comparisons on historical analysis. If the ultimate problem
is simply that looking for "advantage" in law is not what it is about,
then we need to be discussing philosophically what justice requires.
However, if we are rejecting the German advantage based on
intangible elements of legal culture, then Langbein would question:
what elements? In a sense, the difficulty of rejecting Langbein's
argument requires us to understand that we need to rearticulate what
is going on in comparative law, and once we have done that, we need
to begin the substantive work of digging into the nature of the
differences that divide the two legal systems.
There are incredible differences between the structures of
German and American law, and as we have seen above, one of the
critical tools of comparative analysis is understanding the historical
traditions that inform each.82 While we cannot do an exhaustive
survey and in depth study of the rich and complex histories of these
two systems, can sketch out some of the most salient historical details
that allow us to better understand the fundamental nature of the
differences and similarities between the two. As we will see, the
historical contingencies defining the civil procedure of a legal system
demonstrate the way that justice is to be an embodiment of such
procedural principles in that polity. 83 A study of history explains the

way abstract justice is embodied in procedural principles and in the
actual practice of a legal system.
B. Interpretationof Different Traditions
This section will give a bare outline to the apparent conflict
between the procedural elements of the common law and civil law as
ways of getting at truth in a civil trial: what is the goal of each
system? What are the procedural principles in each system about?
What are they? How are they understood?
One of the first things that critics of the German advantage point
to is the authoritarian nature of German legal culture as embodied in
the procedural rules that call for the judge to direct the fact-finding
process. It is clear that one of the fundamental common sources of
law for both the Germanic and English traditions are Roman law and

82. Gordley, supra note 18, at 555-57.
83. An insight predicted by both Tocqueville and Montesquieu.
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its incorporation into the Western tradition through Canon Law."
The significance of this common origin cannot be overstated, since the
historical significance of the natural law tradition that resulted from
these common origins, and the subsequent break with that tradition,
both in England and in Germany, have been formative for the
direction that legal institutions would take.s5 This is because Canon
Law came to be reflected both in Germanic law and in common law
first and foremost as a systematizing and rationalizing of legal
elements, 6 and procedure was one of the main elements passed on to
both.
In civil cases not only the rigors of proof but also, and more
especially, the complexities of taking evidence by written
interrogatories, without participation of a judge, led inevitably to
the widespread use of dilatory tactics by the lawyers. This, in turn,
was counteracted by the establishment of a series of compulsory
stages, with separate rulings by the judge at each stage. However,
the system could not resist the pressure to allow appeals to be
taken from the separate rulings, and then to require such appeals
to be taken at the risk of waiver of the right to object to the rulings
at a later stage. It is not surprising that some cases went on for
years and even decades.
Note that one of the fundamental differences between the two
systems is the way the rule is ascertained to be applied. In England,
courts have no authority to change the rules they made in earlier
cases: the court will "stand by what they have decided," i.e. stare
decisis. Only an Act of Parliament could change a rule established by
precedent. s The decision itself should stand through time as a lesson
from posterity, as something that comes from experience. The law is
a living legacy of what we have learned. Hence:

84.

ALLEN,

supra note 59, at 76-108; BERMAN, supra note 6, at 49-119, 199-224;

JAMES GORDLEY, THE PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS OF MODERN CONTRACT DOCTRINE 10-29,

134-213 (1991).
85. See Watson, supra note 58 (specifically chs. 2 & 4, although the whole book is a
variation on this theme); BERMAN, supra note 6, at 214-229; see also DAVID &
BRIERLEY, supra note 11, at 31-73; NIGEL FOSTER, GERMAN LEGAL SYSTEM & LAWS 14-

23 (2d ed. 1996); ZWEIGERT & KOTZ, supra note 11, at 100, 134, 194.
86. See GORDLEY, supra note 84, at 1-9.

87. BERMAN, supra note 6, at 252 (but see chs. 5 & 6 for the discussion on the Canon
Law as formative to the English and German traditions).
88. See Fred W. Catlett, The Development of the Doctrine of Stare Decisis, 21 WASH.
L. REV. 158 (1946).
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[a] solemn decision upon a point of law, arising in any given case,
becomes an authority in a like case, because it is the highest
evidence which we can have of the law applicable to the subject,
and the judges are bound to follow that decision so long as it stands
unreversed, unless it can be shown that the law was misunderstood
or misapplied in that particular case. 89
This conditions the way that fact-finding is understood. By
requiring that law be pleaded, and the central role of the pleadings in
English law is perhaps one of the key differences between the two
traditions. In Germany, the judge usurps the focus. 90
The critic will argue that this is decisively not the case in
Germany. Indeed, the entire rubric of fact-finding and the process is
built on such an entirely different conception of what a rule is, and
what it is for, that it is impossible to speak of a German advantage.
But this misses the nuances of the German tradition. In Germany the
focus is rationalistic. The rule is in itself a principle of reason, and
this brings us to focus on the important difference between the
common law traditions and civilian traditions: codification. But we
must be clear on what this means, because in the common law
tradition we now have quite a large body of statute law, and it
appears that in many jurisdictions the actual volume of statute law is
increasing. Though it falls on the court to interpret and apply it, it
does in Germany as well. 91 The German trial has a particular
disposition towards truth and "trying" it, and the methods that will
produce it.
The birth of codification movements, and why they did not
succeed in England but were definitive in Germany, is a late
development in this history.9 2 As we have seen, the purpose of the
trial as a revelation of justice, as a way to see truth disclosed, had
local variations, and such variations were conditioned by the way that
Thus, in
the religious heritage had come to be implemented.93
can
cover
Germany and other civilian countries, the rule stands and
all situations. It is the specialized judge's role to ensure that he or
she understands exactly what the facts of the case are so that he or
she can ensure that the correct rule is applied, for it is understood

89. I KENT'S COMMENTARIES 476 (14th ed. 1896).
90. FOSTER, supra note 85, at 121-30.
91. See DAVID & BRIERLEY, supra note 11, at 86-93, 99, 378-82.
92. See DAVID LIEBERMAN, THE PROVINCE OF LEGISLATION DETERMINED (1989).
93. See WATSON, supra note 58, at 1-24.
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that the rule book is itself exhaustive and that the judge simply
applies it.

In England the judge allows the facts to come to be established on
the record. However, it would be misleading to suggest that the judge
plays no role, and the large corpus of evidentiary and procedural rules
at common law attest to the judge's ability to act as trier of fact to
limit the weight of evidence, to direct that motions be drafted for
production of evidence, that pleadings be altered to address issues
that seem to be arising,94 and to force lawyers to be accountable when
they try to enter evidence of questionable origin. Indeed, common law
judges are the triers of fact in many cases, and as such must make
determinations of fact.95 In each instance, however, the judge is faced
with a situation where he or she is involved in determining what
indeed happened, and what is called for.
This suggests that the two traditions are not necessarily
mutually exclusive in their approach to justice, but are, as it were,
variations on a theme. Indeed, Alan Watson has argued that modern
legal systems, because they are so evidently descendants of Rome, are
strange mixtures of tradition, formed by power struggles, custom, and
local exigencies. ° His argument is that these legal systems are
defined entirely by "legal transplants," that is, by foreign ways of
doing things that have been taken on for one reason or another-and
many have looked to this idea as a way to demonstrate that
comparative law is the conscious reconstructive process of fashioning
a legal system out of its own ruins."
Common-law jurisdictions are often contrasted with civilian
systems on the basis of the way the judge applies the law: stare decisis
But we have seen that the historical
versus the civil code.
development does not necessitate placing too heavy an emphasis on
the structural differences in the method of fact-finding and decisionmaking. The difference is not "culturally" insurmountable; one does
not call in anthropologists to render interpretations on the practices of
Germany, one calls lawyers. Indeed, the fact of the existence of
private international law, and of conflicts law, speaks of the
underlying unity of the understanding of what law is about in the
94. I am lead to understand that this is actually quite common.
95. This admittedly ignores the challenge presented by juries as fact-finding entities.
96. See WATSON, supra note 9; WATSON, SOURCES OF LAW, LEGAL CHANGE, AND
AMBIGUITY, supra note 58, at 1-24.

97. See, e.g., Mirjan Damaska, The Uncertain Fate of Evidentiary Transplants:
Anglo-American and Continental Experiements, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 839 (1997);
GORDLEY, supra note 84, at 69-111; Riles, supra note 18, at 221-24.
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Western Legal tradition. It is a deep structure that we put there to
guide our own conduct and need not be more difficult.
And yet, our critic inquires that it would not be realistic to
imagine that even if we adopted aspects of the German model, that
American lawyers and specialists would work their magic to overcome
this. Though we have seen that there are common elements to the
traditions of the common law and its civilian counterpart, one could
argue that since the early 1800s, American adversarial legalism has
developed in distinct contrast to its colonial counterparts." One could
argue that adversarial legalism is not overcome by overhauling the
rules of fact-finding, but rather by overhauling the legal profession, by
uprooting legal institutions that favor it, which is to say, by uprooting
those aspects of American legal tradition that have given rise to it.
On this line of argument, there is something particularly distinct
about American adversarial legalism that eschews the kind of model
championed by Langbein. Can we say that American adversarial
legalism is captured by the spirit of its procedural laws? Is it not that
American adversarial legalism, with its very specific focus on fairness
to each party, may in fact simply re-route any reforms, such that its
adversary nature would be retained?
Langbein directs our attention to the rise of the managerial
judge, 99 and he notes that even though the managerial judge is not the
German judge, that the style of moving toward a "conferencing" model
certainly demonstrates an ability within American legal institutions
to respond to some of American adversarialism's excesses.' °° We can
see that this is not an argument based on culture per se, but rather a
complicated look at the nature of legal institutions in America, and
the social practices that have come to support them as well as be
defined by them.101 Even though the American system is common law
in origin, the legal institutions through which it is expressed are
definitively federalist. Indeed, the adversarial nature of the original
federalist design of the polity itself could be said• to
be
•102 constitutive of
the politico-legal style of governance and political life.
98. See ATIYAH & SUMMERS, supra note 59.
99. See Resnick, supra note 20.
100. Langbein, supra note 1, at 858-66.
101. Robert A. Kagan, Do Lawyers Cause Adversarial Legalism? A Preliminary
Inquiry, 19 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 1, 60-62 (1994).
102. Compare THE FEDERALIST PAPERS (Mentor 1999) (the classic statement by
Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Hay), with 2 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE,
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 304-352 (Henry Reeve trans., Phillips Bradley ed., Vintage
Books 1945) (1848).
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In the civil tradition we do not see adversarialism to the same
extent because the nature of political life is not taken as necessarily
adversarial, but rather as consensual. We can understand this to be
the case by contrasting the institutional design envisioned by the
writers of the U.S. Constitution, as compared with the way the
German polity was conceived in its transformation into a modem
democracy. In America, the founding fathers envisioned a very
adversarial firmament to political life, and as such, designed political
and legal institutions that would ensure that no one could usurp
power without adequate checks and balances. In Germany, the
German diet expressly ensured that the judiciary was but an arm of
the government, and denied the judiciary the ability to undertake the
competence of the legislature or the executive. The civilian tradition
finds its expression here, as the judiciary applies rules to concrete
situations to solve disputes, and that is all. Thus, the style of the trial
in the German model is much more oriented to resolving the dispute
in a way that satisfies the parties; the American model sees a winner
or a loser, and any compromise or settlement has no part in the
justice of the dispute.
Compare the particular vision of what is required by justice as
explicated by Owen Fiss against the German model. In the German
model, consensus and settlement is one of the primary aims of the
procedure, and the judge understands his or her role in terms of
getting to a settlement. Fiss, on the other hand, sees justice
frustrated by the agreement because the principle of justice in the
case was not achieved. In the common law system, the justice of the
dispute is found in the ratio decidendi, the rational principle, or
"answer," to the problem, and as such, it serves as another monument
of justice for the future. Justice is built. In Germany the settlement
of the dispute for the parties results in no addition to the storehouse
of law-law is given.
But the reason that compromise does not seem to figure
prominently into the institutional design of American legal life is not
simply an oversight: it has to do with the fundamental understanding
of what the trial is for. The just trial in America is where each party
has its say.103 One way to understand this is through the conception
103. Though a small sample size, I conducted an informal poll of as many of my
American lawyer/law student colleagues as I could the following question: what
makes a trial just? The overwhelming response was for each party to the dispute to
have their say. This says nothing of the outcome. (Sample size: 12 lawyers/law

students, 4 non-lawyers; all but 2 said, "fair say," was most important. The other two
said, "win-you have to win.").
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of the pleadings and their role. In Germany the pleadings are not
ultimately that important, for even if they do not frame the proper
issue in the dispute, the court will address it during one of the many
"conferences."1 4 Since the accumulation of evidence occurs at times
between these conferences, the conferences become a time of active
judicial direction toward settlement. There is not an overweening
focus on ensuring that the parties had their turn to say their piece,
the nature of the
but rather a quasi-inquisitorial attempt to 10ascertain
5
compromise.
for
possibility
the
dispute and
Pleadings are of the utmost importance in common law
jurisdictions, 106 and the American lawyer is taught at an early age
that the pleadings set the groundwork for the trial because they form
the basis for all evidentiary and procedural motions during the trial.
In fact, summary judgments are often based on insufficient pleadings.
If the young lawyer is continually reminded that procedural savvy is
important for success, then the pleadings are the foundation upon
which one builds. As such, the American system may not seem
designed with compromise in mind, but rather with the struggle of
factions, of difference, of the problem of any one mob getting too much
control. In this important way, however, it is ultimately about
compromise and settlement. If the system of checks and balances
that underlies the American understanding of federalism is based on
a belief that no one understanding should hold sway in political life,
then settlement is the rule. Civil disputes are not about victory, but
really about letting each party put forth their case so that they can
direct the outcome all the more effectively, since the result is the one
they each have to live with. Indeed, based on the fundamental role of
pleadings, for example, or the underlying adversarialism of American
federal institutions,'O7 it is possible to see the adversarial model as
more directed to settlement by virtue of the highly combative nature

104. See Benjamin Kaplan, Civil Procedure-Reflections
Systems, 9 BUFF. L. REV. 409 (1960).

on the Comparison of

105. The inquisatorial approach is generally present in Civilian criminal procedure
and not civil procedure, though elements do appear to creep through. See FOSTER,

supra note 85, at 121-30.
106. Referring only to Britain, Canada, and the U.S.

107. As is made apparent by the manner in which American federal institutions
create statute law such that recourse to court is the only way to interpret law. See
SVEN STEINMO, TAXATION AND DEMOCRACY 160-69 (1993).
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of what occurs. 108It is about the parties and their positioning, not
winning the day.
Another way to grasp the important similarity here is to contrast
Langbein's task with Fiss's task. Fiss is against settlement because
of the effect it has on our public conception of justice as expressed
through judicial opinion. Langbein seems to understand justice
almost entirely in terms of the efficacy of the result, but an efficacy
conditioned by a belief that in each case there is a result that is going
to be reached, either by judgment or by settlement, and that result
will invariably be understood as a "getting things done" or a "settling
of accounts."
Therefore, if the pleadings and style of adversarial legalism
deeply privileges the ability of the party to lead his or her own case
and enter his or her own evidence, does this mean that the German
advantage is not possible in America? Does adversarial legalism's
focus on the parties' right to have their say mean that there is no
room for judges to play an active role in the production of evidence
and the procurement of settlement? Even Langbein notes that the
importation of different types of legal institutions requires particular
attention to the context and the way it would be carried out. Further,
he is explicit that it is not about replacing adversarial legalism, but to
"temper its excesses." Thus, one way to conceptualize how such a
procedural transplant could be affected is to understand the
underlying goal of each process.
In Germany we have seen that the active role of the judge in the
fact-finding process is indeed geared towards early settlement and the
procurement of a just result for the parties through the application of
the appropriate principles. In order to find out which principles are
appropriate, the judge must be actively involved in the way the trial
will unfold so as to best understand the nature of the issue. In an
American court, the parties must lead the right evidence, have the
appropriate expert, and properly draft the pleadings in order to
expedite the process towards settlement.
In each scenario we still understood the purpose of the procedural
nexus as involving the resolving of disputes by an administrative body
called the judiciary, where one model gives primacy to judicial
direction, the other to the parties. Thus at one and the same time we
can see that there are diverse elements that characterize the

108. Which is what makes Fiss so upset, as he would rather see the trial involve
justice.
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American spirit of the laws.'0 9 So even though Allen and his
colleagues state that German judges are distrustful of democracy, it is
clear that the American political tradition was founded on such
distrust."0 Further, any American lawyer knows that the lawyers do
not "run the show" in an American courtroom, but rather the judge
controls the courtroom.
To summarize the way we have come to grasp the aim of
comparative scholarship coupled with the historical traditions we
have briefly looked at, 'we can see that there must be two things that
are already true about what justice requires, both for citizens and of
courts in America and Germany if we are to make sense of advantage.
First, we are all speaking the language of advantage, which is to say,
that a Western world of legal transplants is already engaged in
comparative legal design. Second, the goal of procedure in our polities
is to help solve the coordination problems that arise upon the
submission of evidence. Thus, the fundamental relationship between
procedure and positive law is manifest by the fact that we understand
our legal institutions not as immutable practices, as the sacred cow,
but as institutions that we have designed purposefully to serve our
Because the interests of the day involve first and
interests."'
foremost the solving of disputes in a way that is efficient and rational,
it is difficult to see on what ground we can deny Langbein's
advantage.
V. MAKING SENSE OF THIS ADVANTAGE AND ITS APPLICATION IN
THE U.S. AND CANADA
One way into the phenomenon could be through the very
mechanism that Langbein rejects as an example of increased judicial
authority in the form of "managerial judging."" 2 Though Canada
offers some important differences, in the last eighteen years there has
been an incredible increase in the adversarial nature of Canadian
legal culture. One of the recent initiatives in British Columbia was a
series of "soft" procedural pilot projects designed to "streamline" the
system by attempting to focus the parties more effectively towards
settlement. Interestingly, the ways that the committee in charge of

109. It is important to see that the form of law also conditions a form of conduct. See
TIGAR & LEVY, supra note 59, at 290-309; TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 25.

110. See Allen et al., supra note 8, at 757.
111. See MICHAEL SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1988).

112. See Resnick, supra note 20.
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overseeing and implementing the project chose to proceed was to
ensure that the same judge would hear all motions and aspects of the
dispute. Previously, if a procedural motion was to be brought during
the pre-trial phase of the case, it could be brought in front of a Master
or Chambers judge, and it would simply be the Chambers judge that
happened to be sitting in Chambers that day. Under the pilot project,
the judge assigned to the case in the beginning must hear the motion,
thus cutting down on judge shopping for a procedural motion, and
bringing in the judge to "manage" the trial. Additionally, the
pleadings have been significantly reduced in favor of an outline that
sets out the nature of the dispute and the legal argument, cases, and
precise evidence to be relied upon. This allows the judge the
opportunity to assess the relative merits of the case the first time the
case is filed, which reduces the opportunity for delay or other pre-trial
tactics that degrade the efficacy of the system.
Initially the pilot project was adopted for one year, and only
adopted in the Vancouver courts, but it has been continually renewed,
and plans are in the works to see the project expanded to include the
entire province. Such a piecemeal approach to procedural change,
though seemingly benign, has had a dramatic influence over the
caseload that the Vancouver courts of first instance were hearing, it
has resulted in the production of more organized cases and better
argumentation by virtue of the fact that the lawyers are forced to
present everything at once. Though in Resnick's terms this fits the
"managerial judging" model, it does put the onus on the judge to focus
the parties towards the goal of settling their dispute, which is
ostensibly the predisposition of the German model.
Thus, though there is always room for creative and effective
lawyering, both in the German and American systems, there is always
room for institutional design and procedural change, and the reason
for this is that we no longer understand our legal processes as
manifesting some divine being, but rather as ways of human action
geared toward creating the conditions for two parties to come to
agreement: our institutions are ours to design. Langbein is certainly
not arguing for a wholesale discarding of American civil procedure
and an adoption of the German model, but perhaps for a more modest
demand of looking at the institutions of American adversarial
legalism and assessing if there is some way that the procedures can
be finessed or altered such that they are not self-defeating.
To conclude, there does therefore appear to be an advantage in a
real sense; the excesses of American adversarial legalism are ours to
temper, and we need to ask if we would like to do so. If we would,
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then we need to look for ways to enhance the function of legal
institutions. John Langbein has looked at the German model, and
has suggested some reasonable ways that judges can be given a role
that will dissuade unhelpful legal maneuvering on the part of the
parties. He has helped to focus our sights on the fact that advantage
is efficiency at getting to the heart of the matter, and it is formed by a
concern for getting to justice and settling the dispute.
The
comparativist knows that such things are conditioned by history and
the spirit of the laws, which is to say that it may not be easy or
automatically commensurable with American pragmatism. But what
would it have to be to be incommensurable? And what exactly would
be incommensurable about it? The nature of law in the U.S. is tightly
woven through with an adversarial legalism and procedural focus on
justice, and to say that one could simply adopt the German advantage
at once misses the complex way that such adoption of laws and
systems as tools for the achievement of justice is a totalizing
phenomenon: we are talking about piecemeal change. The differences
between the American and German models are ones of design, not
concept.
The comparativist studies the law elsewhere in order to learn
about home; Langbein grasps the difficulties of application. 113 And not
only is this not to make light of comparative research into the German
model, it is to inquire about the possibility of law reform and how it is
that we can effect change from within. Legal institutions are put
there by us to effect ends we divine, hence we can change them if we
find they do not suit our needs. Similarly, the German advantage is
not an advantage for Germans, it simply is the way they see it.
"Advantage" exists in terms of ends we seek to achieve, and the
German advantage is construed in terms of our own tradition; it is an
advantage for us. Langbein is not saying that we abandon what we
do here, but rather that we attempt to make sense of the different
styles in a way that makes sense for us. And so comparative law
proceeds from the oft-grounded assumption that there is something of
merit in looking to other legal traditions for an understanding of our
own. The rich history of the German and American traditions, though
manifesting different historical experiences, challenges, and
successes, is nonetheless very Western and hence positivist. Finally,
that the ethos of American adversarial legalism is of such a pragmatic
kind that it most certainly would be able to make sense of an
advantage in German civil procedure.

113. Langbein, supra note 1, at 842.
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VI. CONCLUSION: WHAT THIS ARGUMENT DOES NOT SAY,
A PHILOSOPHICAL CAVEAT

The main point we have come to articulate is that if comparative
law is possible, then the fruit of comparative law is also possible. The
degree to which a given aspect of comparative legal research yields
insight into the prospect of reform depends in large measure on the
nature of the reform proposed. It most certainly makes sense to
speak of a German advantage in civil procedure, and there are most
certainly avenues for reform in adopting it. The reason for this is that
the common heritage of the Western Legal Tradition speaks to a
similar way of conceiving of the law as a particular means for settling
disputes, of the court and the trial as a procedure for justice, and
hence, necessarily positivist. The commonality in aim and history
should not be over-emphasized to a degree that mocks the very
important and significant essential differences in the conceptions that
underpin each; however, I have argued that the differences between
American and German civil procedure, though apparently different,
are of the same ilk.
There are a number of things that follow from this, and for
However, there are a number of things that
comparative law.
specifically do not follow from this, and I want to be clear about what
has not been established by such research. By identifying and
understanding modern civil procedure in Germany and America as
having become largely positivist in its self-understanding, and thus
amenable to reform, I am not saying that this is the way that we
ought to think about law in its proper sense. I am also not saying
that positive law or the rule of law, as put in place by office holders, is
a well thought out, philosophically exhaustive account of the
possibilities for polities. Rather, my account focuses exclusively on
the way that American adversarial legalism and German procedural
To say that we ought to
laws are contemporarily understood.
understand law in this way requires a philosophical approach to the
existence of legal phenomena. I have shown that it is not at all
ridiculous to speak of a German advantage in civil procedure given
the contemporary understanding of law, its role and history, and its
future in American adversarial legalism. If law is a means to an end,
then it is something we can alter to fit our needs. As such, we
certainly could adopt the German advantage. But if law is an end in
itself, we need to address entirely different questions, and advantage
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would not make sense among polities that understood law as such.1
However, we are not faced with that here, or perhaps any longer.

114. In such a case one would look to Jean-Jacques Rousseau's The Social Contract
and Immanuel Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals as places to begin.

